Who Holds the Key? Water, Trees and Land as Commons in Songs of Dust and Water and in Japan’s Iriai Lands and Irrigation Districts
- Written as
- An imagined student aged 17, third year, global course at a prefectural high school in the Saku area, Nagano Prefecture
- Format
- Period for Inquiry-Based Cross-Disciplinary Study (sōgōteki na tankyū no jikan), final research report, written in English
- Task
- Choose a work of literature from outside Japan and investigate one social or environmental question it raises, using at least one academic source and one comparison with Japan. Present your findings as a research report.
- Length
- 2,751 words, not counting headings and references
1. Research question
How does the village of Nafawol in M.J. Hydara’s novel Songs of Dust and Water (2026) manage its water, trees and land as shared resources, and how does its system compare with two Japanese ways of managing commons: iriai common lands and satoyama, and the land improvement districts that run farmers’ irrigation?
I want to answer a smaller question inside this one as well. In everyday Japanese we often use “shared” (kyōyū) loosely, as if anything that is not private must belong to everyone. I wanted to find out whether the novel separates different kinds of “shared”, and whether those separations match the ones that Japanese villages made over several hundred years.
2. Background
2.1 The novel
Songs of Dust and Water has two parts. Part One, set in the fictional Republic of Awdagha, tells how a solar and water plant in the village of Madina is built by an outside fund, taken over by a minister and destroyed by fire. Part Two, “The Water-Keeper”, is set ten years later in the fictional Republic of Tekuru, on a floodplain that the river has abandoned. The well at Nafawol has been turning salty for six years. Dr Arramata, an engineer born in the village, brings an air-water harvester paid for by the Proxima Fund, and the village slowly builds a road, a mill, a common fund and finally a union of villages. In Year 7 the union refuses a very large offer from a company, TransGlobal Agriculture, by a vote with stones. Page numbers below refer to the paperback.
2.2 Iriai and satoyama
In Japan, iriai means the right of the people of a village to use land together, usually forest or grassland on the mountain, for firewood, grass for fertiliser and fodder, thatch and wild plants. The land itself might belong to the village or to someone else; the iriai right is a right of use held by the community. The Civil Code of 1896 recognised iriai rights and left their details to local custom. After 1966 a national law encouraged villages to convert iriai land into modern forms of ownership, and much of it was divided or put into forestry associations.
Satoyama is a related but wider word. It describes the mixed landscape near villages: secondary woodland, paddy fields, irrigation ponds and grassland, kept in a particular state because people used them every year. When villages changed from firewood and charcoal to oil and gas in the 1960s, much satoyama woodland stopped being cut and became overgrown. In 2010 Japan’s Ministry of the Environment and the United Nations University launched the Satoyama Initiative at the biodiversity conference in Nagoya, to support landscapes of this kind around the world.
2.3 Land improvement districts
The Land Improvement Act (1949) allows farmers in an area to form a land improvement district (tochi kairyō-ku), a public body run by its members that builds, maintains and manages irrigation and drainage. In my own area the Gorobei Canal, about 20 kilometres long, was built in the early Edo period by Ichikawa Gorobei to bring water to the dry uplands of Saku. It is still managed by the Gorobei Yōsui Land Improvement District, and in 2018 it was registered as a World Heritage Irrigation Structure (Nagano Prefecture, 2025). When I was in the fourth year of elementary school, our class visited the canal’s intake, and my grandfather still goes out every spring with the other farmers to clean the channel.
2.4 Ostrom
Elinor Ostrom’s Governing the Commons (1990) argues against the idea that shared resources must be either taken over by the state or divided into private property. She studies communities that have managed commons for a long time and finds eight shared features, which she calls design principles. They include clearly defined boundaries, rules that fit local conditions, the right of users to take part in changing the rules, monitoring, sanctions that begin small and grow, cheap ways of settling conflicts, and recognition by the government of the community’s right to organise itself. One of her examples is three Japanese villages, Hirano, Nagaike and Yamanoka, which she describes using the research of Margaret McKean (1982). In these villages the community decided when the mountain commons could be opened for cutting, every household had to contribute labour, and villagers took turns to patrol the commons. People who broke the rules were fined, at first lightly, and the fine could sometimes be paid in sake. Ostrom’s point is that the rules were made and enforced by the users themselves.
3. Method
I used two methods. First, close reading: I read the novel twice and recorded every passage about who may use water, trees or land, who decides, and what happens when a rule is broken. I sorted these passages using Ostrom’s eight principles as categories. Second, comparison: I compared the results with the Japanese examples in section 2, using Ostrom’s book, Japanese government sources and an interview with my grandfather about canal work.
A limitation is that the novel is fiction. I am not judging whether Nafawol’s system would work in a real country. I am asking what distinctions the novel makes, and whether they are precise.
4. Findings
4.1 Water: the difference between a well and a machine
The first important distinction in the novel is made by Kadiatou, the Water-Keeper, before anything is built. She tells her friend Fatou: “A well has no gate. Anyone with a rope may draw from it. A machine like that is kept behind a fence, and somebody holds the key” (p. 92). Fatou answers with an example from her own trade: when one man owns the only lorry, “he’s kind all through the planting. At harvest he names his price” (p. 92).
I think this is the most precise sentence in the book about commons, because it separates two things that are easy to confuse. The old well is open access: there is no gate, and in the story there is also no rule about how much one person may take. The harvester is a closed resource with a key. Both are shared in some sense, so the useful question is who holds the key. When the agreement is signed, the answer is very concrete: the committee keeps the padlock (p. 101), and Fatou is given the key and puts it “in her purse, with her coins” (p. 101). The fifth clause says Proxima keeps a second key for ten years, and Mamadou comments, “In ten years a heifer is a grandmother” (p. 101). When Adam finally hands the second key back, Fatou says, “It was always ours. This is only the receipt” (p. 213).
The novel also separates two kinds of water. The harvester’s water is for drinking, the borehole goes down to “the deep water”, and Dr Arramata explains that “Every litre this makes is one we leave in the deep water” (p. 103). Earlier she refuses to pump deep water for salt removal because it “is the water your grandchildren should drink” (p. 90). This means the deep water is treated as a commons shared with people who are not yet born. In Year 8, when the borehole falls, the village rations the taps to two hours morning and evening, and Isatou ticks “off each compound’s buckets against the mouths Fatou had written beside its name” (p. 205). This is the first time the novel shows the village setting a limit for each household, and it happens only when the resource is in crisis.
4.3 Land: the soil, the channels and the herders
After the ñan-kale, the public test field, the old farmer Ousman accepts the new methods but says to Dr Arramata: “The water is yours. The soil is ours. Do not confuse them” (p. 107). I find this sentence interesting because it is a boundary drawn by a user, not by the engineer. Knowledge and machines can come from outside, but the land stays under the village’s judgement.
The work on the dead river channels shows something else. Before the stone lines are built, Mamadou visits the herders’ camp, because “Their cattle had walked those dead beds since before the river left, and nobody had asked them about stones” (p. 126). He goes back “twice more before they agreed where the cattle would cross” (p. 126). In Ostrom’s terms, the herders are also appropriators of the channels, even though they are not members of the village committee, and the work cannot succeed without their agreement. The old men explain why they build lines that will only pay in ten or fifteen years: “‘For us,’ one of the old men said, and set another stone” (p. 126). Here the commons extends backwards in time as well as forwards.
4.4 Rules, monitoring and sanctions
Almost all of Ostrom’s principles can be found in Nafawol. Monitoring is done by putting the ledger on a wall every Friday. Isatou, who runs the women’s osusu, explains the idea with her own savings pot: “A pot everyone can see into does not empty in the night” (p. 132). When the banking inspector finds two errors, including a payment with only two signatures, she says: “If you let it be two when it is convenient, it will be two when it is not” (p. 138). The sanctions are graduated. Fatou’s own mistake is corrected with a line in the ledger and her full name. Lamin, Mamadou’s grandson, who takes small sums just below the three-signature line, must sell his motorbike and work off the rest, and his name and Mamadou’s are both written down.
The novel also touches Ostrom’s last two principles, though the seventh, recognition by the government, appears mostly through its absence. When the government’s safety inspector seals Sirawol’s mill boiler, Fatou says, “Sulayman cannot take the Fund … So he has taken the mill,” and Kadiatou corrects her: “He has taken the year” (p. 160). The villages then write a common charter, because, in Kadiatou’s words, “A rope of four strands is not four ropes” (p. 165), and in Fatou’s, a charter “would have stopped him choosing which of us he came for” (p. 165). This is close to what Ostrom calls nested enterprises, her eighth principle.
5. Discussion
5.1 Where Nafawol and Japan are similar
The strongest similarity is that the rules are made by the people who will live with the results. Proxima’s own rule says the money continues only while what is built belongs to the village and is run by its people. The Japanese villages in Ostrom’s book also made their own rules and patrolled the commons themselves. In both cases the rules are detailed and practical, for example the exact signature threshold, or the day the mountain opens.
The second similarity is with the land improvement district. Nafawol’s Coffer Fund is re-registered as “a village savings society under the banking law”, and later every village fund becomes a cooperative society inside a registered union. A land improvement district is also a farmers’ organisation given legal status by the state. My grandfather told me that the district’s office keeps the accounts, but the work of cleaning the channel is still done by the farmers together in spring, and a household that does not send anyone pays a small charge. This is a sanction, but a mild one, like Nafawol’s corrected ledger lines.
5.2 Where they are different
I found three important differences.
The first is boundaries. Japanese iriai villages had very clear membership: you used the mountain because you were a household of that village. Nafawol’s boundaries are open and keep changing. The union grows to thirty-one villages, and one village, Kerewol, repays its loan, sells its mill and leaves. The narrator says, “The charter allowed it, and nobody had been able to tell Kerewol it was wrong” (p. 225). I think this is a realistic detail. A commons that anyone may join must also allow members to leave, and leaving is harder to prevent than entering.
The second is the role of the state. Ostrom’s seventh principle is that the government recognises the users’ right to organise. The Japanese state recognised iriai in the Civil Code and gives land improvement districts legal status, although after 1966 it also encouraged the end of many iriai lands. In the novel, Tekuru’s state is suspicious. The minister tries to take control of the fund, and when the union is registered he replies that “the Republic knew of no place called Senebia” (p. 173). Nafawol survives mainly because it puts every paper in public and finds allies such as the banking regulator. The novel seems to say that legal recognition can come from one office of the state while another office is hostile.
The third difference is the hardest. Satoyama declined in Japan because people stopped needing it, after fuel and fertiliser could be bought. A commons that is no longer used is no longer maintained. In Nafawol the danger is the opposite: an outsider offers to pay for everything. TransGlobal’s offer would have given each family fifty thousand dollars, but the company would hold a veto over large investments and the first right to buy every bale. When Evelyn Reed of TransGlobal offers to help the union grow faster, the reply is short: “With whose hand on the key,” Kadiatou said (p. 187). It repeats her first distinction about the well and the fence. The vote of fourteen to ten refuses the offer, and the novel shows the costs honestly: a student loses a year, a family leaves for the coast, and the hospital is never built. In the novel the village keeps the key and pays for keeping it, and I do not think the book claims more than that.
6. Conclusion
Nafawol manages its water, trees and land through rules that its own people write, check in public and enforce with graduated sanctions, which matches most of Ostrom’s design principles and is similar to Japanese iriai villages and land improvement districts. The novel is especially careful about distinctions. It does not treat “common” as one thing, and its most important question is always who holds the key. It differs from the Japanese cases in its open boundaries, its difficult relationship with the state, and the fact that its main danger is a generous buyer rather than abandonment.
Through this research I understood that the canal my grandfather cleans is not public in the way a road is public, and not private like our field. It is held by the people who use it, under rules they agreed to. I had never had a word for that before. In future I would like to interview members of a land improvement district about how decisions are made at their meetings, and compare them with the council scenes in the novel more exactly.
References
Hydara, M.J. (2026). Songs of Dust and Water (paperback, ISBN 9798162251088).
Land Improvement Act (Act No. 195 of 1949), Japan.
McKean, M. A. (1982). The Japanese experience with scarcity: Management of traditional common lands. Environmental Review, 6(2), 63–88.
Nagano Prefecture, Saku Regional Development Bureau. (2025, September 5). Press release on the Gorobei Yōsui learning session [in Japanese].
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.
Ministry of the Environment, Japan, & United Nations University Institute of Advanced Studies. (2010). The Satoyama Initiative.
Interview with my grandfather, a member of a land improvement district in the Saku area (August 2026).
